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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, forty-year-old James Edward Jones pleaded guilty
to felony domestic violence in the presence of a child and felony intimidating a witness.
The district court essentially imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years
fixed.

The district court also entered an amended no contact order prohibiting

Mr. Jones from contacting the victim or his daughter until 2024.

Mr. Jones filed a

motion to modify the amended no contact order, and an Idaho Criminal Rule 35

(hereinafter, Rule 35) motion for a reduction of sentence, but the district court denied
both motions.
On appeal, Mr. Jones asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it
denied his motion to modify the amended no contact order, when it essentially imposed
a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed, and when it denied his
Rule 35 motion.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Officer Ellsworth with the Garden City Police Department went to St. Luke's
Hospital in Meridian in response to a domestic battery report.

(Presentence Report

(hereinafter, PSI), p.3.) At the hospital, Christina August related that about four days
earlier, she had told her partner Mr. Jones that she was going to leave him and take
their one-year-old daughter L.J. with her. (PSI, p.3;

see PSI, p.11.) Mr. Jones then

reportedly kicked her near the thigh, yelled at her, kicked her in the ribs, pushed her
down on the bed in her bedroom, punched her in the head twice with a closed fist, and
restrained her on the bed. (PSI, p.3.) Ms. August had two broken ribs. (PSI, p.3.) She
also stated that L.J. had been present during the incident. (PSI, p.3.)
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The State filed a Complaint alleging that Mr. Jones had committed the crimes of
domestic violence in the presence of a child, felony, in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18903(a), 18-918(2), and 18-918(4 ), and attempted strangulation, felony, in violation of
I.C. § 18-923.

(R., pp.5-6.)

The magistrate issued a no contact order prohibiting

Mr. Jones from any contact with Ms. August., L.J., or E.B. (another minor child) until
September 11, 2015 or the dismissal of the case, whichever occurred first. (R., p.9.)
Mr. Jones then wrote a letter addressed to his sister. (PSI, p.4;

see PSI, pp.76-

77.) Ms. August told the authorities that the letter was actually meant for her.

(PSI,

p.76.) The letter stated that Mr. Jones hoped that the addressee would not show up in
court, and that the addressee would recommend that Mr. Jones be placed in Domestic
Violence Court. (PSI, pp.4, 86.)
Later, the State filed an Amended Complaint alleging that Mr. Jones had
committed the crimes of felony domestic violence in the presence of a child, felony
attempted strangulation, and intimidating, impeding, influencing, or preventing the
attendance of a witness, felony, in violation of I.C. § 18-2604.

(R., pp.19-21.) After

Mr. Jones waived a preliminary hearing, the magistrate bound him over to the district
court. (R., p.25.) The State then filed an Information charging Mr. Jones with the above
three offenses. (R., pp.28-29.) Mr. Jones subsequently filed a motion to modify the no
contact order, requesting that the district court allow contact between Mr. Jones and L.J.
(See R., pp.34-35.)
Mr. Jones then agreed, pursuant to a plea agreement, to plead guilty to felony
domestic violence in the presence of a child and felony intimidating a witness.

(See

R., p.41; Tr., p.4, Ls.16-18.) In exchange, the State would dismiss the felony attempted
strangulation charge and refrain from filing a Part II of the Information charging
2

Mr. Jones with a persistent violator sentencing enhancement. (See R., pp.41-42, 48;
Tr., Nov. 1, 2013, p.5, Ls.23-24.) The State would recommend an underlying unified
sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed. (R., p.41; Tr., Nov. 1, 2013, p.5, Ls.8-9.)
If Mr. Jones were deemed to be amenable to treatment and a low to moderate risk to
reoffend, the State would cap its recommendation at a retained jurisdiction "rider"
program. (R., p.41; Tr., Nov. 1, 2013, p.5, Ls.9-13.) If Mr. Jones were deemed to not
be amenable to treatment, or a high risk to reoffend, the State would be free to argue for
imposition of the sentence, and Mr. Jones would be free to argue for less. (R., p.41;
Tr., Nov. 1, 2013, p.5, Ls.14-17.) The district court accepted Mr. Jones's guilty pleas.
(R., p.41; Tr., Nov. 1, 2013, p.12, L.17 - p.13, L.7.) The district court also ordered

Mr. Jones to undergo a domestic violence evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 18-918(7)(a).
(R., pp.52-54.) Additionally, the district court denied the motion to modify the no contact

order. (R., p.40; Tr., Nov. 1, 2013, p.13, L.17-p.17, L.5.)
The presentence report stated that Mr. Jones had an aggregate LSI-R score of
41, "which places him in the High Risk category."

(PSI, pp.15-16.)

Mr. Jones's

Domestic Battery Evaluation, prepared by Tom Wilson, MA, LCPC, stated that
Mr. Jones's "profile falls in the high risk range for re-offending." (PSI, pp.157, 174.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State, based on the results from the domestic
violence evaluation, recommended that the district court essentially impose a unified
sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed. (R., p.56; Tr., Jan. 7, 2014, p.8, L.6 p.9, L.1.)

The State also requested a no contact order with Ms. August and L.J.

(Tr., Jan. 7, 2014, p.9, Ls.4-9.) Mr. Jones recommended that the State impose a unified
sentence of fifteen years, with one and one-half years fixed. (Tr., Jan. 7, 2014, p.20,
Ls.1-11.)
3

The district court essentially imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five
years fixed. (Tr., Jan. 7, 2014, p.30, Ls.8-10.) Specifically, the district court imposed a
unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, for the felony domestic violence in
the presence of a child count, and a consecutive sentence of five years indeterminate
for the felony intimidating a witness count.

(R., pp.60-64.)

The district court also

entered an Amended No Contact Order, prohibiting Mr. Jones from contacting
Ms. August or L.J. until after January 6, 2024. (R., p.57; Tr., Jan. 7, 2014, p.31, L.12 p.32, L.1.)
Mr. Jones subsequently filed a Motion to Modify No Contact Order, requesting
that the district court modify the Amended No Contact Order with respect to his minor
child, L.J.

(R., pp.66-67.) At the hearing on the motion to modify the amended no

contact order, Mr. Jones clarified that he would prefer in-person visits with L.J. by way
of a third person taking L.J. to the prison to visit him. (Tr., Feb. 19, 2014, p.6, L.24 p.7, L.4.) At a minimum, Mr. Jones wanted to have contact with L.J. via phone, mail, or
video.

(Tr., Feb. 19, 2014, p.6, Ls.21-23.)

The State argued against granting the

motion, contending that L.J. had been a witness to Mr. Jones's violence against
Ms. August and that L.J. was too young to be emotionally equipped to deal with
contacting Mr. Jones. (R., p.71;Tr., Feb.19.2014, p.7, L.16-p.8, L.10.)
The district court denied the motion to modify the amended no contact order.
(R., p.71.) The district court "share[d] the concerns raised about contact or visitation at
the correctional facility involving the child of this young lady's tender years."
(Tr., Feb. 19, 2014, p.10, Ls.9-12.) The district court indicated that it would consider
revisiting the no contact order if a family law court determined whether or not visitation
were appropriate. (Tr., Feb. 19, 2014, p.10, Ls.16-24.)
4

Mr. Jones then filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Judgment
and Commitment. (R., pp.72-74.)
Mr. Jones also filed a Motion for Reconsideration and for Leave, pursuant to
Idaho Criminal Rule 35. (R., p.77.) Later, he filed an Addendum to Defendant's Motion
Pursuant to ICR 35. (Addendum to Defendant's Motion Pursuant to ICR 35 (hereinafter,
Addendum), Apr. 9, 2014.)

The district court denied the Rule 35 motion. 1

(Order

Denying Rule 35 Motion, June 16, 2014.)

The Addendum and Order Denying Rule 35 Motion are the items attached to
Mr. Jones's Motion to Augment the Record and Statement in Support Thereof, filed with
this Appellant's Brief.
5
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ISSUES

1

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Jones's motion to
modify the amended no contact order?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it essentially imposed a unified
sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed, upon Mr. Jones following his guilty
plea to felony domestic violence in the presence of a child and felony intimidating
a witness?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Jones's Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 Motion for a reduction of sentence?

6

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Jones's Motion To Modify
The Amended No Contact Order
Mr. Jones asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his
motion to modify the amended no contact order, because the denial unconstitutionally
interferes with Mr. Jones's fundamental right as L.J.'s parent.
"The decision whether to modify a no contact order is within the sound discretion
of the district court." State v. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769, 771 (2010). When reviewing a
discretionary decision by a district court, an appellate court conducts a multi-part inquiry
into (1) whether the district court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) whether the district court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it;
and (3) whether the district court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v.
Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,600 (1989).
In this case, the district court abused its discretion when it denied the motion to
modify the amended no contact order, because the denial unconstitutionally interferes
with Mr. Jones's fundamental right as L.J.'s parent. While Mr. Jones did not raise this
objection before the district court, it may be raised for the first time on appeal as
fundamental error. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010).
[l]n cases of unobjected to fundamental error: (1) the defendant must
demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional
rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or obvious, without the
need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record,
including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error affected
the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that it must
have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.
7

Id.
Here, one of Mr. Jones's unwaived constitutional rights was violated, because
the denial of the motion to modify the amended no contact order unconstitutionally
interferes with his fundamental right as L.J.'s parent. The fundamental right to parent
one's children is well established in Idaho. See, e.g., State v. Doe, ·144 Idaho 534, 536
(2007); Leavitt v. Leavitt, 142 Idaho 664, 670 (2006). The liberty interest of "parents in
the care, custody, and control of their children is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests recognized by" the United States Supreme Court. Troxell v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).

The fundamental right to parent one's children "does not

evaporate simply because they have not been model parents. . . . Even when blood
relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable
destruction of their family life." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
The

denial

of the

motion

to

modify the

amended

no

contact order

unconstitutionally interferes with this fundamental right of Mr. Jones. It interferes with
his fundamental right as L.J.'s parent because the amended no contact order prohibits
Mr. Jones from contacting L.J. until after January 6, 2024. (R., p.57.)

Because the

denial leaves in place the amended no contact order's absolute prohibition against
Mr. Jones contacting L.J. until she will be fourteen years old (see R., p.57; PSI, pp.1,
"'

11 ), the denial will irretrievably destroy his family life with her. See Santosky, 455 U.S.
at 753. Thus, the denial interferes with Mr. Jones's fundamental right as L.J.'s parent.
This interference rises to an unconstitutional level because clear and convincing
evidence does not support the denial of the motion to modify the no contact order. In
Santosky, the United States Supreme Court held that "[b]efore a State may sever
completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process
8

requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence."
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747-48; see State v. Doe, 144 Idaho at 536. Because the denial
of the motion to modify the amended no contract order means that Mr. Jones is
prohibited from contacting L.J. during the bulk of her formative years, it effectively
severs his rights as L.J.'s parent.

Thus, Mr. Jones asserts that the Santosky due

process standard should apply here.
Should this Court apply the Santosky due process standard to the district court's
denial of the motion to modify the no contact order, clear and convincing evidence does
not support the denial. Clear and convincing evidence is evidence indicating that the
thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. In re Doe, 143 Idaho 188,
191 (2006).

An appellate court reviews a decision requiring clear and convincing

evidence to determine whether the decision is supported by substantial and competent
evidence, meaning evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.

Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243, 245-46 (2009).

If the decision

requires clear and convincing evidence (as opposed to a mere preponderance of the
evidence), the substantial evidence test requires a greater quantum of evidence. In re
Doe, 143 Idaho 343, 346 (2006).
Here, clear and convincing evidence does not support the district court's denial of
the motion to modify the amended no contact order.

While Mr. Jones was abusive

towards Ms. August, the record does not show that he was directly abusive towards L.J.
In fact, Mr. Jones counts L.J. as one of the most important parts of his life, and has the
goal of getting the no contact order lifted so he can see her. (PSI, p.15.) Further, even
if he cannot see her in person because visiting prison would not be appropriate for a
child of L.J.'s current age, no clear and convincing evidence shows that Mr. Jones
9

should be similarly prohibited from contacting L.J. via phone, mail, or video. Thus, clear
and convincing evidence does not support the denial of the motion to modify the
amended no contact order.
Because clear and convincing evidence does not support the district court's
denial of the motion to modify the amended no contact order, the denial does not meet
the Santosky due process standard.

See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747-48. Thus, the

denial of the motion to modify the amended no contract order unconstitutionally
interferes with Mr. Jones's fundamental right as L.J.'s parent. See id. at 753. One of
Mr. Jones's unwaived constitutional rights was violated.
The error here is clear and obvious. The amended no contact order explicitly
states that Mr. Jones may not contact L.J. until 2024. (R., p.57.)

Thus, it is clear that

the denial of the motion to modify the no contact order unconstitutionally interferes with
his fundamental right as L.J.'s parent. There is no need for "any additional information
not contained in the appellate record." See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. Further, because
the denial does unconstitutionally interfere with Mr. Jones's fundamental right as L.J.'s
parent, it cannot be said that the failure to object on this basis was a tactical decision by
the defense. Cf State v. Adams, 147 Idaho 857, 860-62 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding that
the failure to exclude a juror may have been a tactical decision by the defense, because
the record did not clearly show that the juror would be biased against the defendant).
The error is also not harmless because it affected Mr. Jones's substantial rights.
It affected his substantial rights because the error affected the outcome of whether the
district court would modify the no contact order. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. Had the
district court recognized that the denial would

unconstitutionally interfere with

Mr. Jones's fundamental right as L.J.'s parent, it conceivably would have granted the
10

motion to modify the amended no contact order to avoid violating one of Mr. Jones's
unwaived constitutional rights. Thus, the error is not harmless.
In sum, the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to modify
the amended no contact order, because the denial unconstitutionally interferes with
Mr. Jones's fundamental right as L.J.'s parent.

This issue may be raised as

fundamental error because the denial clearly violated one of Mr. Jones's unwaived
constitutional rights and affected his substantive rights.

The district court's order

denying the motion to modify the amended no contact order should be vacated, and the
case remanded to the district court with instructions to allow contact between Mr. Jones
and L.J., with the specific constraints to be determined by the district court.

11.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Essentially Imposed A Unified
Sentence Of Fifteen Years, With Five Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Jones Following His Guilty
Plea To Felony Domestic Violence In The Presence Of A Child And Felony Intimidating
A Witness
Mr. Jones asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed his
sentence, because the sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts.

As

discussed above, the district court essentially imposed a unified sentence of fifteen
years, with five years fixed, through imposing a unified sentence of ten years, with five
years fixed, for the felony domestic violence in the presence of a child count, and a
consecutive sentence of five years indeterminate for the felony intimidating a witness
count. (R., pp.60-64.)
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record

11

giving "due regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence." State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

Mr. Jones does not allege that his sentence exceeds the

statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Jones
must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive
considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of criminal
punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing.

Id. An appellate court, "[w]hen reviewing the length of a sentence ...

consider[s] the defendant's entire sentence."

State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726

(2007). The reviewing court will "presume that the fixed portion of the sentence will be
the defendant's probable term of confinement." Id.
Mr. Jones submits that, because the district court did not give adequate
consideration to mitigating factors, the sentence imposed by the district court is
excessive considering any view of the facts.

Specifically, the district court did not

adequately consider Mr. Jones's difficult childhood. When Mr. Jones was an infant, his
biological mother dropped him off with his stepfather.

(PSI, p.210.)

His biological

mother was a drug addict, and Mr. Jones had been malnourished.

(PSI, p.210.)

Mr. Jones's stepfather reported that Mr. Jones had been almost starved to death, and
that it took almost six months to build up his energy to the point where he was normally
alert. (PSI, p.361.) Mr. Jones, who lived with his stepfather until he was sixteen years
12

old, reported that his stepfather was physically and mentally abusive.

(PSI, pp.21 0,

When he was fourteen years old, he briefly went to live with his biological mother,
but he reported that his biological mother then sexually molested him.

(PSI, p.210.)

Mr. Jones also reported using school as an escape from his stepfather's abuse, and
that he would start fights at school after his stepfather hit him. (PSI, p.360.) Adequate
consideration of Mr. Jones's difficult childhood should have led to a lesser sentence.
Additionally, the district court did not adequately consider Mr. Jones's mental
health issues. A district court must consider evidence of a defendant's mental condition
offered at the time of sentencing. See I.C. § 19-2523(1 ).

Mr. Jones has issues with

anxiety, controlling his anger, and other mental health concerns. His GAIN-I evaluation
reflects that Mr. Jones self-reported symptoms consistent with the diagnosis of a mood
disorder and generalized anxiety disorder.

(PSI, p.33.)

In 2003, Mr. Jones was

admitted to lntermountain Hospital for anger issues and increased panic attacks. (PSI,
pp.214-15.)

He was diagnosed with antisocial personal disorder, bipolar disorder, and

likely attention deficit disorder. (PSI, p.215.) Later in 2003, he was again admitted to
lntermountain Hospital, this time for suicidal ideation, and was diagnosed with bipolar
affective disorder. (PSI, p.215.) He also reported being admitted to lntermountain in
2007. (PSI, p.160.) Adequate consideration of Mr. Jones's mental health issues should
have resulted in a lesser sentence.
The district court also did not adequately consider Mr. Jones's substance abuse
problems. The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized substance abuse as a mitigating
factor in cases where it found a sentence to be excessive. See, e.g., State v. Nice, 103
Idaho 89, 91 (1982). Mr. Jones has a long history of struggle with substance abuse.
He was diagnosed with amphetamine dependence, cannabis dependence, and opoid
13

dependence in his GAIN-I evaluation.

I, p.30.)

He was also diagnosed with

methamphetamine abuse in 2003. (PSI, p.30.) He began using marijuana and alcohol
at age fifteen, methamphetamine at age twenty-six, and synthetic cannabinoids at age
thirty-three. (PSI, p.14.)
For a while, Mr. Jones had been managing his substance abuse problems. After
being placed on probation in 2011, he reported that he used marijuana almost daily.
(PSI, p.14.)

However, he then started taking medication from Access Behavioral

Health, and sharply reduced his marijuana use to about once a month or less. (PSI,
p.14.)
Unfortunately, Mr. Jones relapsed, which contributed to the instant domestic
violence offense. About three months before the offense, Mr. Jones stopped taking his
medication and began smoking marijuana daily.

(PSI, p.14.)

He also began using

methamphetamine again for the first time in six years, smoking it daily and then
eventually using it intravenously. (PSI, pp.14, 159.) Mr. Jones stated that he started
using methamphetamine together with Ms. August.

(PSI, p.10.)

He reported using

methamphetamine cut with bath salts. (PSI, p.14.) Mr. Jones stated that he last used
methamphetamine on or around the day of the offense, or about four days before his
arrest. (See PSI, pp.3, 14.) In the domestic battery evaluation, Mr. Jones stated that he
was unable to calm down after Ms. August told him she was leaving with L.J. because
of his heavy methamphetamine use. (PSI, p.158.) He had been awake for a couple
days. (PSI, p.6.) He also reported that he did not remember most of what happened
the night of the incident because he blacked out. (PSI, p.158.)
Mr. Jones wants treatment for his substance abuse problems. Despite his long
struggle with substance abuse, at his GAIN-I evaluation he reported no history of
14

substance abuse treatment. (PSI, p.32.)

His counsel stated at the sentencing hearing

that Mr. Jones "indicates that he did a rider back in 1992, but other than that he really
hasn't had intensive treatment that he is so desperately asking the Court to give him."
(Tr., Jan. 7, 2014, p.19, Ls.21-24.) Mr. Jones now admits that he has a drug problem,
and he wants to participate in treatment to help him remain drug-free. (PSI, p.14.) At
the sentencing hearing, Mr. Jones's counsel told the district court that Mr. Jones
"desperately wants to get a handle on his addiction and his anger issues. And by no
means is he saying that because he is an addict that it is okay for him to be angry and
to commit the offenses that he has committed."

(Tr., Jan. 7, 2014, p.19, Ls.5-12.)

Mr. Jones "wants to better himself not only for himself, but also this little girl who is
growing up who is his daughter." (Tr., Jan. 7, 2014, p.19, Ls.5-12.)
Mr. Jones has a long history of struggle with substance abuse, and his substance
abuse problems contributed to the instant domestic violence offense. But Mr. Jones
also now admits that he has a drug problem, and wants substance abuse treatment.
Adequate consideration of Mr. Jones' substance abuse problems should have led to a
lesser sentence.
Because the district court did not adequately consider the above mitigating
factors, the sentence imposed is excessive considering any view of the facts. Thus, the
district court abused its discretion when it imposed Mr. Jones's sentence.

111.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Jones's Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence
Mr. Jones asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his
Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence, in view of new and information presented to
15

the district court.

"A motion to alter an otherwise lawful

under Rule 35 is

addressed to the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for
leniency which may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe."
State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted). "The denial of a
motion for modification of a sentence will not be disturbed absent a showing that the
court abused its discretion."

Id.

'The criteria for examining rulings denying the

requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original
sentence was reasonable." Id. "If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced,
the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional
information presented with the motion for reduction." Id.
Mr. Jones asserts that his sentence is excessive in view of new and additional
information presented with the motion for reduction. Specifically, the new and additional
information shows that Mr. Jones continues to desire treatment and has taken steps to
better his situation.

(See Addendum.) Mr. Jones wrote that he was in Dealing with

Schizophrenia, Relapse Prevention, and Anger Management courses, and that he was
working in the kitchen. (Addendum, p.2.) He was signed up for a future Alternative to
Violence class. (Addendum, p.2.)
The offender concern forms, or "kites," submitted with his Addendum to
Defendant's Motion Pursuant to ICR 35, also show that Mr. Jones continues to desire
treatment and has taken steps to better his situation. The kites reflect that Mr. Jones
was interested in signing up for Anger Management courses, that he completed a selfhelp workbook, and that he was participating in the Dealing with Schizophrenia group
course. (Addendum, pp.4-6.) The kites also show that Mr. Jones was willing to "work
any position and at any time to get my foot in the door." (Addendum, p.3.)
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The new and additional information presented with the motion for reduction
shows that Mr. Jones continues to desire treatment and has taken steps to better his
situation.

Mr. Jones' sentence is excessive in view of this new and additional

information. Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35
motion for a reduction of sentence.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Jones respectfully requests that this Court vacate the
district court's order denying his motion to modify the amended no contact order and
remand his case to the district court with instructions to allow contact between
Mr. Jones and L.J., with the specific constraints to be determined by the district court.
Alternatively, he requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
Alternatively, he requests that this Court remand his case to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 14th day of August, 2014.
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